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Abstract
Background
In October 2014, Chile implemented a tax modification on sugar-sweetened beverages
(SSBs) called the Impuesto Adicional a las Bebidas Analcoho´licas (IABA). The design of the
tax was unique, increasing the tax on soft drinks above 6.25 grams of added sugar per 100
mL and decreasing the tax for those below this threshold.
Methods and findings
This study evaluates Chile’s SSB tax, which was announced in March 2014 and imple-
mented in October 2014. We used household-level grocery-purchasing data from 2011 to
2015 for 2,836 households living in cities representative of the urban population of Chile.
We employed a fixed-effects econometric approach and estimated the before–after change
in purchasing of SSBs controlling for seasonality, general time trend, temperature, and eco-
nomic fluctuations as well as time-invariant household characteristics. Results showed sig-
nificant changes in purchasing for the statistically preferred model: while there was a barely
significant decrease in the volume of all soft drinks, there was a highly significant decrease
in the monthly purchased volume of the higher-taxed, sugary soft drinks by 21.6%. The
direction of this reduction was robust to different empirical modelling approaches, but the
statistical significance and the magnitude of the changes varied considerably. The reduction
in soft drink purchasing was most evident amongst higher socioeconomic groups and higher
pretax purchasers of sugary soft drinks. There was no systematic, robust pattern in the esti-
mates by household obesity status. After tax implementation, the purchase prices of soft
drinks decreased for the items for which the tax rate was reduced, but they remained
unchanged for sugary items, for which the tax was increased. However, the purchase prices
increased for sugary soft drinks at the time of the policy announcement. The main limitations
include a lack of a randomised design, limiting the extent of causal inference possible, and
the focus on purchasing data rather than consumption or health outcomes.
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Conclusions
The results of subgroup analyses suggest that the policy may have been partially effective,
though not necessarily in ways that are likely to reduce socioeconomic inequalities in diet-
related health. It remains unclear whether the policy has had a major, overall population-
level impact. Additionally, because the present study examined purchasing of soft drinks for
only 1 year, a longer-term evaluation—ideally including an assessment of consumption and
health impacts—should be conducted in future research.
Trial registration
ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT02926001
Author summary
Why was this study done?
• Chile and other countries in the world are facing a major challenge to curb rising rates
of obesity and diet-related ill health, often particularly among lower socioeconomic
groups.
• Fiscal policy has the potential to influence consumption patterns towards healthier
options (and raise government revenue for welfare-enhancing purposes), thereby con-
tributing to the prevention of chronic diseases and to the reduction of the associated
economic costs.
• Most existing evidence on the effects of fiscal incentives to promote diet-related health
relies on small-scale experiments or hypothetical simulations using price elasticity esti-
mated from observational data, largely suggesting that increasing the price of products
such as sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) would reduce purchasing or consumption.
There is, however, a scarcity of empirical evaluations of actual diet-related fiscal inter-
ventions, and it is still uncertain whether these can be effective in improving population
diet and health in a ‘real world’ context.
What did the researchers do and find?
• This study evaluates the tax policy applied to SSBs in Chile. The ‘Impuesto Adicional a
las Bebidas Analcoho´licas’ (IABA; or ‘additional tax on nonalcoholic drinks’), which
was announced in March 2014 and implemented in October 2014. The IABA policy tar-
geted any nonalcoholic beverages to which colorants, flavourings, or sweeteners have
been added. For beverages with an added sugar concentration of 6.25 grams per 100 mL
(or equivalent proportion) or more, the tax was increased from 13% to 18%, while for
those below this threshold, the tax was decreased from 13% to 10%, producing an 8%
tax difference.
• We applied a series of econometric approaches to evaluate the effects of the announce-
ment and implementation of the tax policy, using household-level grocery-purchasing
data from Chile for 3 years pre- and 1 year post-tax implementation.
Sugar-sweetened beverage tax in Chile
PLOS Medicine | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002596 July 3, 2018 2 / 22
Investigacio´n Cientı´fica y Tecnolo´gica of Chile
(http://www.conicyt.cl/) under grant MR/N026640/
1. The funders had no role in study design, data
collection and analysis, decision to publish, or
preparation of the manuscript.
Competing interests: The authors have declared
that no competing interests exist.
Abbreviations: AIC, Akaike Information Criterion;
BMI, body mass index; DiD, difference-in-
difference; IABA, Impuesto Adicional a las Bebidas
Analcoho´licas; NCD, noncommunicable disease;
RTM, regression to the mean; SES, socioeconomic
status; SKU, stock-keeping unit; SSB, sugar-
sweetened beverage; VAT, value-added tax.
• We find that, despite the fact that the tax incentive is comparatively small, there are
signs that purchasing of SSBs with higher sugar content has been reduced among high
socioeconomic groups of the population.
What do these findings mean?
• The results suggest that the Chilean tax policy may have been partially effective, though
not necessarily in ways that are likely to reduce socioeconomic inequalities in diet-
related health.
• Longer-term evaluations are needed to analyse the effect on SSB purchasing in the long
run as well as on health outcomes.
• The evaluation did not involve a randomised design, therefore the degree to which we
can interpret the results as truly causal will be limited.
Introduction
Reducing the global burden of noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) has been widely recognised
as a global health priority [1]. Diet-related health problems account for a large and growing
share of the NCD burden worldwide, causing substantial human suffering and adverse eco-
nomic consequences [2,3]. The situation is of particular concern in Latin America and the
Caribbean—a region that has been predicted to reach the highest levels of overweight and obe-
sity worldwide by 2030 [4].
The 2013 Global Burden of Disease estimates show that high body mass index (BMI) is the
second most important risk factor in Chile [5]. As evidence from various Chilean surveys con-
sistently suggests, obesity has been increasing steadily in children, adults, and pregnant women
over the 2000–2010 period [6]. Evidence also indicates that it is those from lower socioeconomic
backgrounds in Chile who are particularly prone to being overweight and obese [7,8]. In 2014,
Chile topped the worldwide ranking of per capita daily sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) con-
sumption while also recording the highest growth rate of SSB consumption in the 2009–2014
period [9]. The Chilean National Food Consumption Survey (2010–2012) shows that the
median consumption of SSBs, a factor that has been directly linked with child obesity, in Chil-
ean children is close to 500 mL per day [10]. To put this into perspective, such consumption lev-
els are only matched by the highest-consuming 5% of United States children [11].
Fiscal policies have the potential to promote healthier consumption patterns, thereby con-
tributing to the prevention of chronic diseases and their associated economic costs. They may
also lead to increased government revenue that could, in turn, be used for welfare-enhancing
purposes. The current evidence base, however, is decidedly mixed as to what the expected
effects of a fiscal incentive will be [12,13]. The majority of the evidence rests on the modelling
of hypothetical policy scenarios rather than on the evaluation of real-life policy reforms. A
small number of countries have recently implemented taxes on certain types of ‘unhealthy’
foods and/or beverages, as characterised by their high sugar, fat, or salt content. Evaluation evi-
dence fromMexico [14], Denmark [15], Hungary [16], and from Berkeley, California [17]
does highlight some early success in these cases.
Since 1960, Chile has had a tax on nonalcoholic drinks called the Impuesto Adicional a las
Bebidas Analcoho´licas (IABA; or ‘additional tax on soft drinks’) [18,19]. This is an ad valorem
Sugar-sweetened beverage tax in Chile
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tax, and the tax rate has been fixed at 13% since 1976, without any formal impact evaluation.
In March 2014, the Parliament announced a modification of IABA. At that point, the plan was
to focus on a tax increase (by 5%) for all soft drinks containing any added sugar. At a later
point—but still ahead of the October 2014 implementation—it was decided to reduce the tax
rate by 3% for soft drinks containing low sugar levels. In October 2014, Chile implemented the
tax modification. The tax affects any nonalcoholic beverages, or soft drinks, to which colour-
ants, flavourings, or sweeteners have been added. For beverages above an added sugar concen-
tration of at least 6.25 grams per 100 mL, the tax was increased from 13% to 18%, while for
those below this threshold, the tax was decreased from 13% to 10%, effectively creating an 8%
tax difference between these beverage groups. This means that, if the tax was fully transmitted
to the consumer price, the price of a typical, 500-mL sugary carbonated drink would increase
from about 500 to 525 pesos. For the less sugary drink of the same size, the price would
decrease from about 500 to 485 pesos. For the sugary drink item, the magnitude of price
change in Chile is comparable to or slightly smaller than the price change that would be cre-
ated by a complete pass-through of the tax that was implemented in Berkeley (0.01 US dollar
per ounce, equivalent to an increase in price from 500 to 563 Chilean pesos based on 2014 Pur-
chasing Power Parity) [17] and in Mexico (1 Mexican peso per litre, equivalent to an increase
in price from 500 to 524 Chilean pesos) [20]. For other beverages without flavour, sweeteners,
or colourants (e.g., plain mineral water), there was no tax prior to the reform, and no addi-
tional taxation was introduced. These tax rates were applied in addition to the existing value-
added tax (VAT) of 19%, and no other major policies were implemented around the same
time that would influence purchasing and consumption of soft drinks.
There are several ways in which the nature of the tax policy in Chile is different from tax
policies on soft drinks implemented elsewhere. For example, in Berkeley and Mexico, the size
of the tax amount increases linearly with the volume of the relevant sugary drink (as defined in
the policy). The Chilean tax, on the other hand, set a threshold of sugar content and applied
either a tax rate increase or decrease to products above or below the threshold. The simulta-
neous tax increase and tax decrease makes Chile a unique case.
In this paper, we undertake an evaluation of Chile’s IABA tax to assess whether household
purchasing of soft drinks have been reduced after the policy’s announcement and implementa-
tion. Our analysis protocol was published at www.ClinicalTrials.gov (Identifier: NCT02926001)
before the study commenced [21]. We set out to answer the following research questions:
1. Were the announcement and implementation (and/or the announcement) of the IABA tax
policy associated with a change in the volume of soft drinks purchased and the amount of
sugar from soft drinks purchased?
2. Was the policy associated with a change in the prices of soft drinks that consumers paid?
3. Was the policy associated with a change in the shopping patterns of consumers, including
the frequency of purchases of soft drinks and the use of price promotions?
4. Were there differential changes in outcomes of interest by key household characteristics,
i.e., socioeconomic status (SES), BMI, and the pretax purchasing of soft drinks?
Methods
Data
We used household-level food-purchasing data collected by a leading commercial research
company (Kantar WorldPanel) for the time period of January 2011 to December 2015 (https://
Sugar-sweetened beverage tax in Chile
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www.kantarworldpanel.com/cl/; contact: Marı´a Paz Roma´n: mariapaz.roman@kantarworld-
panel.com). The data are based on households’ weekly purchases of ‘fast-moving consumer
goods’—i.e., beverages, grocery (except for meats, fruits, and vegetables), dairy, household
cleaners, and personal care items—from cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants, representing
74% of the urban population. The survey aimed at collecting information from 2,000 house-
holds, but due to replacements of households during the survey period, the raw data contain a
total of 2,836 households. The data include detailed transaction records of the take-home pur-
chases, and for the present study, we focused on the category of nonalcoholic beverages
(excluding coffee, tea, and dairy products).
The data also include information on relevant household characteristics such as SES, region
of residence, and BMI of all household members. SES is determined by a Chile-specific mea-
sure that combines occupation and level of education of the household head and the size of a
household’s property [22]. BMI is self-reported and recorded once per year.
The Kantar WorldPanel used the 2002 national census survey and other sources to define
the target population for sampling. A stratified random sampling method, coupled with the
Random Iterative Method weighting [23], was then performed by the data company. The sam-
ple is representative with respect to the age of the main shopper, household SES, and the region
of residence (North, Valparaiso Region, Center South, Bio-Bio Region, and South).
Households who agreed to participate in the survey were asked by Kantar WorldPanel to
keep information of purchased items in the form of till receipts, product packages with bar-
codes, and a daily log sheet of purchases. The log sheet served as a source for products without
barcodes or when till receipts were not provided. Kantar WorldPanel employed field workers
to visit the households each week to record the purchases using the collected information.
Observations for households were included by Kantar WorldPanel if a household provided
satisfactory information in the first 2 months. The quality of data from each household was
monitored continuously; when missing data, inaccurate reporting, and/or misreporting were
detected, Kantar WorldPanel estimated purchases using information from other households
in the same residential area. In rare cases, missing data were imputed using data from house-
holds with similar socioeconomic and/or demographic characteristics. When households
dropped out of the survey due to an unwillingness to continue (e.g., health reasons), change of
physical address, or poor compliance, then new households with similar characteristics were
recruited to maintain the sample size and representativeness.
The replacement rate of households was about 15% per year. This is comparable, for exam-
ple, with a national longitudinal survey of poverty in Chile (i.e., 10%–16% [La Encuesta Panel
CASEN data]) and a major household survey in the US (i.e., 7.7%–14.8% [The Medical Expen-
diture Panel Survey]). During the survey at hand, each month approximately 3% of the house-
holds provided insufficient data. Those households were excluded from the database for that
specific month (which is indicated in the data). If such a household consistently showed data
quality problems, the household was replaced.
Because the Kantar WorldPanel data do not contain nutritional information for specific
products, we complemented the product information in the data with information on sugar
content for all products that account for the top 90% of sales of all soft drinks in the Kantar
WorldPanel data. This information was collected from several sources, including a large,
nationally representative survey [24], manufacturers’ documents and web pages, and national
health authorities’ surveillance systems [25]. All soft drink products were coded into the fol-
lowing 3 categories based on the sugar content threshold set out in the IABA policy: (1) non-
taxed products (nonsugary, nonflavoured, noncoloured products), (2) low-taxed products
(containing equal to or less than 6.25 grams of sugar per 100 mL), and (3) high-taxed products
(containing more than 6.25 grams of sugar per 100 mL). We calculated the monthly volume of
Sugar-sweetened beverage tax in Chile
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purchased items for these 3 categories and hereafter refer to them as ‘no-tax’, ‘low-tax’, and
‘high-tax’.
We constructed a monthly, household-level panel dataset to analyse the impact of the IABA
policy on the volume of soft drinks purchased. In addition, we constructed a product-level
panel dataset at the level of stock-keeping unit (SKU) and used the average price of products in
each month to examine the impact of the tax on prices paid by the households. It should be
noted that the Kantar WorldPanel offers ‘transaction-based’ data, i.e., the price of a product is
recorded only when a transaction is made. These data capture the prices that were actually
paid by households rather than the prices that were posted in the stores. In other words, the
price data capture an aspect of consumers’ behavioural response to the tax, namely, price-
accepting behaviour. For example, if the average price paid for a product or product category
has not changed in response to the tax, this could mean that the consumers did not accept the
higher price, and so they may reduce purchases of soft drinks or buy items only when the price
appears reasonable to them. This contrasts with previous analyses that have looked at the
impact of a tax on prices that were posted in stores and thus limits the extent to which we can
draw comparisons with studies of price pass-through [26].
Finally, we also linked the Kantar WorldPanel data with information for regional unem-
ployment and temperature. For unemployment, we used the database provided by the Chilean
National Institute of Statistics [27], and for temperature, data were obtained from the Centre
for Climate Research and Resiliency [28].
Analytic methods
In this study, we employed a quasi-experimental approach to evaluate the impact of the tax
policy. There was no experimental manipulation of the tax rate; instead, the government
decided to introduce the tax policy to reduce the high prevalence of obesity and related NCDs.
Nonetheless, we regarded the policy implementation as an intervention that generated varia-
tions in the tax rate, and we estimated the impact of the policy under certain assumptions
described below [29,30].
Because the tax policy was implemented nationwide at a single point in time, the entire
Chilean population was exposed to the policy, and there are no direct comparison groups for
the evaluation within Chile. Our empirical approach therefore relies on the time series varia-
tions before and after the tax implementation in October 2014.
For the analyses of volumes and prices of items purchased, we used a fixed-effects regres-
sion approach [31]. A key assumption of this approach is that, after controlling for households’
(time-invariant) unobserved characteristics and the general time trend and seasonality of the
outcome variables, any remaining changes in purchasing of soft drinks in the post-tax period
are attributable to the tax. If there are other factors that are time-varying and affect the out-
come variables that are unaccounted for, then the estimated impacts will be biased.
We estimated the following linear model with household fixed effects:
logYit ¼ bi þ tPost þ xit
0φþ fðtÞ þ dmonth þ εit; ð1Þ
where logYit is the log of per capita volume of items purchased by household i at period t. If a
panel household did not show any record of purchasing of soft drinks for a given month, the
outcome variable for the household was imputed as 0. The household fixed effect is repre-
sented by Či, which captures household time-invariant unobservable characteristics that may
affect purchasing of soft drinks. ‘Post’ is an indicator variable taking a value of 1 if the purchase
is made on or after 1 October 2014, and 0 otherwise. The vector xit includes the temperature
and unemployment rate for a household’s region of residence. Temperature controls for the
Sugar-sweetened beverage tax in Chile
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variation of demand for soft drinks due to climate, whereas the unemployment rate controls
for the variation of macroeconomic conditions. The term f(t) is a function to control for a gen-
eral time trend. We used a flexible approach to polynomial modelling, and the Akaike Infor-
mation Criterion (AIC) was employed to select the order of the polynomial with the best fit. In
this study, we selected a polynomial of order 4, i.e., f(t) = ċ1t + ċ2t2 + ċ3t3 + ċ4t4 (where ċ1, ċ2,
ċ3, and ċ4 are parameters and t is centered at October 2014, when the policy was implemented,
taking a value of 0). The term Ďmonth represents the month of the year effects, which captures
seasonality. Finally, it is the idiosyncratic error term. The within-household impact of the tax
policy is represented by the parameter τ.
To look at the change in the prices paid for items purchased by the consumers, we used a
similar model specification but with SKU-level fixed effects. The model is given as the follow-
ing:
logPit ¼ ai þ yPost þ gðtÞ þ dmonth þ εit; ð2Þ
where log Pit is the logged average price per unit volume of product i at period t. ‘Post’ is again
the policy indicator variable, ċi represents product fixed effects, capturing a product’s time-
invariant unobservable characteristics, and g(t) is a polynomial to control for a general time
trend, selected based on AIC (corresponding to f(t) in equation [1]). The idiosyncratic error is
represented by ďit. In this model, the parameter θ captures the impact of the tax after it is
introduced.
To explore the sensitivity of the results to other modelling approaches, we complemented
the above fixed-effects regression approach with a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach.
This approach uses previous time periods of the treated population as a comparison group and
thus diverges from a standard DiD approach that uses 2 distinct groups. A similar methodol-
ogy was employed in a previous evaluation of the impact of an SSB tax in Mexico [14]. For fur-
ther details, see S1 Text.
Outcome variables and subsample analyses
Differential changes by tax category and share of soft drink purchases. Given that the
IABA tax policy increased the tax rate by 5% (from 13% to 18%) for soft drinks above the
sugar threshold but reduced the tax rate by 3% for beverages below the sugar threshold, we
conducted the analysis for ‘low-tax’ products and ‘high-tax‘ products separately. We also
looked at trends in the separate ‘no-tax’ product category.
In an extension of our main analysis, we also ran the models with the outcome variable as
the share of purchases of all soft drinks making up a specific tax category. This was done to
analyse changes in the composition of the basket of all soft drinks that consumers purchased
in a month.
Policy announcement. One possibility is that a change in purchasing of soft drinks may
have occurred when the policy was announced at the end of March 2014, several months prior
to implementation. Consumers and the beverage industry could have changed behaviours and
practices solely due to the policy’s announcement—e.g., consumers could anticipate purchases
in bulk to save on future price increases, and the industry could potentially increase the price
prior to the actual implementation date. Therefore, the expected overall change in purchasing
is ex ante ambiguous. We examined the announcement effect by running models (1) and (2)
with the ‘Post’ variable set to April 2014, directly after the announcement date in late March.
Volume of sugar from soft drink items. A key objective of the policy was to reduce the
amount of sugar purchased by reducing the purchases of high–sugar-content products.
Because we collected information on the sugar content of all soft drinks, we estimated the
Sugar-sweetened beverage tax in Chile
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association between the policy implementation and the volume of added sugar purchased
from all soft drinks.
Shopping patterns. It is conceivable that, in response to the tax, the households might
have decided to cut down on the frequency with which they purchased the higher-taxed soft
drinks, and they may have also cut down on the volume of those products purchased in each
shopping occasion in response to the higher price. It may also be that consumers increasingly
targeted price promotions to cope with the expected price increase for the higher-taxed soft
drinks. To examine this, we looked at changes in household shopping patterns in 2 ways. First,
we analysed the number of days per month involving purchases of any soft drinks, and second,
we explored whether the households used more price promotions in the post-tax compared to
the pretax period.
Differential changes by socioeconomic group, BMI, and pretax purchased volume. We
also investigated whether a change in purchasing was more pronounced for poorer groups
than for wealthier ones. This was done by dividing the households into 3 socioeconomic
groups and conducting the analyses separately for each subgroup. In the primary analysis,
socioeconomic groups were classified using a standard Chilean SES classification provided by
Kantar WorldPanel. Alternatively, we proxied for SES using the level of education of the
household head, the occupation of the household head, and a composite indicator combining
the occupation and the education of the household head and partner with asset ownership
using a multivariate analysis (see S2 Text and S1 Fig) [32]. We also disaggregated household
purchases by mean household BMI of adult members aged 18 years and over. We classified
households into the following 3 groups: normal weight (<25 average BMI), overweight (25
average BMI and<30 average BMI), and obese (30 average BMI).
A final subgroup analysis looked at the changes among households with different levels of
purchasing of beverages in the pretax period. We classified households into 3 categories based
on their purchasing of high-tax items prior to the tax implementation.
Results
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of products and households from January 2011 to
December 2015.
The total number of products is 816, with 386 ‘high-tax’ products, 384 ‘low-tax’ products,
and 46 ‘no-tax’ products. The composition of these tax categories by beverage category (i.e.,
soda, light soda, juice, or mineral water) is shown in S2 Table. The number of households in
the sample is 2,836. S3 Table presents the descriptive statistics by socioeconomic group.
Volume of soft drinks purchased
Fig 1 provides a descriptive, visual presentation of the aggregated mean volume of soft drinks
purchased over time before and after the implementation of the tax policy (see S2 Fig for the
figure for sugar).
For all soft drinks and for the relevant soft drink subcategories (except the no-tax soft
drinks, which show a trend increase), it is hard to detect a clear overall time trend based on
pure visual inspection alone. While the peaks in the data certainly become less pronounced
over time, so have some of the troughs. It is equally difficult to discern an obvious pre- versus
post-tax pattern in any of the categories.
Table 2 presents the results of the main regression analyses.
Based on the principle of including the time polynomial that minimises the AIC, the main
results included up to a fourth-order polynomial of time (see S4 Fig for a visual illustration of
the fit of the model to the data). The results indicate a barely significant decrease in the volume
Sugar-sweetened beverage tax in Chile
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Table 1. Descriptive information.
A: Household Information
Proportion
SES
High 35.8%
Middle 30.2%
Low 34.0%
Occupation
None 8.6%
Unskilled 12.2%
Skilled 64.8%
Retired 14.4%
Education
None 26.8%
Primary 21.4%
Secondary 37.8%
Tertiary 14.0%
Mean SD
Age 48.32 14.76
Family Size 4.14 1.66
BMI (Mean Adult) 26.65 3.04
Number of Households 2,836
Number of Observations 113,044
B: Monthly Purchase Information
Mean SD
Volume (mL)
All soft drinks 7,349.5 6,839.5
High-tax soft drinks 3,574.8 4,407.7
Low-tax soft drinks 2,627.9 3,810.4
No-tax soft drinks 379.1 1,257.7
Sugar (g) 373.5 443.3
C: Product Information
Price (Chilean Peso) per 100 mL
All soft drinks 52.25 35.11
High-tax soft drinks 63.38 33.17
Low-tax soft drinks 39.88 34.3
No-tax soft drinks 41.4 23.41
Sugar (g contained per 100 mL) 6.02 5.28
Number of Products (Observations)
All soft drinks 816 (37,699)
High-tax soft drinks 386 (19,693)
Low-tax soft drinks 384 (15,632)
No-tax soft drinks 46 (2,374)
Number of observations is based on outcomes over 60 months from January 2011 to December 2015. Volume (mL)
of items purchased per capita per month. For sugar, the unit of measurement is g per 100 mL. 3. SES is that given by
Kantar WorldPanel. Occupation, education, and age refer to the household head. Mean adult BMI is calculated for all
household members older than 18 years. If a household did not participate in 2014, we prioritised the use of
subsequent years (2015, 2013, 2012, 2011). The number of products is based on SKU; i.e., items with different
barcodes (for example, items with the same ingredients but with different package sizes) are treated as distinct SKUs.
Abbreviations: BMI, body mass index; SES, socioeconomic status; SKU, stock-keeping unit.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002596.t001
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of all soft drinks purchased but a highly significant decrease on the monthly purchased volume
of high-tax soft drinks by 21.6% (i.e., the implied proportionate change, with the point estimate
−0.244 and standard error 0.044). This corresponds to a reduction of 766 mL per person per
month for an average household (the mean of pretax volume is 3,544.8 mL per person per
month). The change in purchasing is also reflected in the significant 15.1% decrease in the
amount of sugar purchased via soft drinks (point estimate −0.164; standard error 0.029). By
contrast, we detected no significant change in either the volume of low-tax items or in the vol-
ume of no-tax items purchased. The alternative DiD regression approach largely confirms the
results from our preferred fixed-effects approach (see S1 Table). In an assessment of the
announcement of the tax, we found no significant changes in all, high-tax, and no-tax
Fig 1. Volume (mL) of soft drink products purchased from January 2011 to December 2015. (A) All beverages, (B) high-tax products, (C) low-tax
category, (D) no-tax category. Aggregated mean volume of soft drinks purchased from January 2011 to December 2015. The grey vertical dotted line in the
figure refers to the announcement of the IABA tax policy in March 2014, whereas the red vertical dotted line is for the implementation of the policy in
October 2014. Source: authors’ analysis of the Kantar WorldPanel data for urban households in Chile. IABA, Impuesto Adicional a las Bebidas
Analcoho´licas.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002596.g001
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beverages and sugar purchasing, but we did see a decline in purchasing of low-tax soft drinks
(see S4 Table).
For both high-tax soft drinks and the amount of sugar purchased, the overall change in volume
appears to be driven by a decrease in the purchasing among the middle- and high-SES groups as
well as in the high pretax purchasers, which saw a significant reduction in the volume of high-tax
soft drinks of 16.4% (point estimate −0.179; standard error 0.076), 31.3% (point estimate −0.376;
standard error 0.078), and 25.3% (point estimate 0.292; standard error 0.053), respectively (also
see S5 Table). For the amount of sugar purchased, the magnitudes of the reductions were 13.5%
(point estimate −0.145; standard error 0.051) for the middle-SES group, 20.1% (point estimate
−0.225; standard error 0.049) for the high-SES group, and 23.6% (point estimate −0.212; standard
error 0.038) for the high pretax purchasers, respectively (also see S5 Table). This pattern of results
was robust to the different SES measures mentioned above (see S6 Table).
Table 2. Results from fixed-effects volume regression model (outcome in log mL).
All SES
Low Middle High
All Soft Drink
Point estimate −0.060 −0.043 −0.067 −0.057
Standard error 0.024 0.045 0.041 0.039
Proportionate change −5.8% −4.2% −6.5% −5.5%
Pretax mean outcome (mL) 7,341.40 6,567.39 7,217.27 8,100.41
High-Tax Soft Drink
Point estimate −0.244 −0.129 −0.179 −0.376
Standard error 0.044 0.073 0.076 0.078
Proportionate change −21.6% −12.1% −16.4% −31.3%
Pretax mean outcome (mL) 3,544.84 3,524.01 3,715.24 3,427.45
Low-Tax Soft Drink
Point estimate 0.030 −0.188 0.200 0.073
Standard error 0.062 0.114 0.119 0.094
Proportionate change 3.0% −17.1% 22.1% 7.6%
Pretax mean outcome (mL) 2,627.91 2,059.60 2,422.93 3,275.52
No-Tax Soft Drink
Point estimate −0.105 −0.068 0.083 −0.270
Standard error 0.054 0.088 0.102 0.092
Proportionate change −10.0% −6.6% 8.7% −23.7%
Pretax mean outcome (mL) 337.77 180.59 286.84 512.31
Sugar
Point estimate −0.164 −0.093 −0.145 −0.225
Standard error 0.029 0.05 0.051 0.049
Proportionate change −15.1% −8.9% −13.5% −20.1%
Pretax mean outcome (mL) 368.85 443.51 382.14 366.94
Number of Households 2,836 1,120 963 1,138
Number of Observations 113,044 36,443 34,010 42,591
The number of households in each SES group does not add to the total households due to movement between groups. Proportionate change = exp(point estimate) − 1.

P< 0.05

P< 0.01

P< 0.001.
Abbreviation: SES, socioeconomic status.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002596.t002
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S7 Table presents the association between the tax implementation and the share of the
expenditure of each tax group (e.g., high-tax soft drinks) out of the total soft drink expenditure.
The results indicate that there was a shift in the composition of the soft drinks purchased post
tax implementation, as the expenditure share of high-tax soft drinks decreased while that of
low-tax items increased.
In S5 Table and S8 Table, we further disaggregated the main analysis by splitting the sample
by risk factor groups, according to either the mean BMI of adults in the households or the level
of per capita purchasing of high-tax soft drinks before the tax. The reduction in purchasing of
high-tax items is statistically significant in all BMI groups, and there was no systematic pat-
terning in the magnitude of the effect across groups. For groups categorised according to their
pretax purchasing volume of high-tax soft drinks, there was a significant reduction of similar
size in the middle and highest groups and no statistically significant impact among those in
the lowest group.
Further results reported in S9 Table and S10 Table explored the sensitivity of the point esti-
mates to different choices of functional form of the time trend. All the models with the full
sample indicated a reduction in the volume of high-tax soft drinks and the amount of sugar
purchased, but the reduction was only statistically significant using higher order (fourth and
fifth) polynomials, as well as a linear time trend. By SES subgroup, for the high-tax soft drinks,
all models showed a significant volume decrease that varied from −12.8% to −31.3% in the
high-SES subgroup and from −6.9% to −21.2% in the high pretax volume purchasers. In the
low pretax volume purchasers, all the model specifications indicated a nonsignificant change
for the high-tax soft drinks and the amount of sugar purchased. For the other subgroups, in
both the volume of high-tax soft drinks purchased and the volume of sugar purchased, a signif-
icant decrease was found in some models, while no significant change was observed in other
model specifications. For low-tax soft drinks, the full sample models indicated a nonsignificant
change or a significant increase of up to 14.6% in the purchased volume. In the middle-SES,
the low-BMI, and the low pretax volume subgroups, the results varied from a nonsignificant
change to a significant increase of up to 25.2%, 21.1%, and 18.1%, respectively. For the other
subgroups, all the models indicated nonsignificant changes.
Paid price
S3 Fig presents the descriptive picture of the prices (per 100 mL) of the relevant soft drink cate-
gories that were paid by consumers, rather than those that were posted in stores. Overall, there
was an upward trend in prices for all tax categories. For the high-tax item category, we
observed an increase precisely after the announcement of the policy (end of March 2014),
which was also seen in the all-soft drink category. After the implementation of the policy, how-
ever, the lines appear to revert back to the longer-term trend.
Table 3 provides the regression results for price, distinguishing between a potential ‘imple-
mentation effect’ and an ‘announcement effect’.
The results show that prices of all soft drinks and of the high-tax soft drinks increased
after the announcement, though not after implementation. The magnitude of the price
change was a 1.6% increase for all soft drinks (point estimate 0.016; standard error 0.01) and a
1.9% (point estimate 0.019; standard error 0.01) increase for high-tax items. In addition, the
price of low-tax items declined by 1.7% (point estimate 0.017; standard error 0.01) upon tax
implementation.
S11 Table provides the results of the price regressions by SES. As with our pooled
results, the results by SES show that there were few changes in the price of each type of
item. Notably, whereas before we saw a modest decrease in the price of low-tax items after the
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implementation, this effect now disappears. There was a 2% to 3% decline, however, in the
price of high-tax items for the middle- and low-SES groups.
Shopping pattern
Going beyond the analysis of the volume of soft drinks purchased, we also sought to under-
stand some of the potential mechanisms behind the observed changes. In particular, we exam-
ined changes in price and in certain shopping patterns. In S12 Table, we examined the
association between the tax implementation and the number of days per month involving pur-
chases of any soft drinks, i.e., the frequency of shopping trips. The frequency of shopping trips
that included high-tax soft drinks decreased by 7.8% (point estimate −0.081; standard error
0.011), and these changes are visible in all SES groups, though they are more significant and
larger in the middle- and high-SES groups. The change in the frequency of shopping trips
involving low-tax soft drinks was only significant for the high-SES group, with a 5.0% reduc-
tion (point estimate −0.051; standard error 0.016).
Furthermore, we explored whether one way for consumers to ‘cope’ with the tax increase
was to revert increasingly to the purchase of price-promoted items. Such behaviour seemed to
unfold both in relation to high-tax and low-tax soft drinks. In S13 Table, we observe a less than
1% increase in the use of price promotions, which appears to be driven by the high-SES group
for high-tax items.
In S14 Table, the main analysis was separately conducted by product type, with categories
including ready-to-drink, concentrated, carbonated, and noncarbonated beverages. The type
of retailer—major chain store or local, independent store—was also examined. The results
show that, first, the association between purchasing and tax implementation was pronounced
for ready-to-drink items, and there was only a small, nonsignificant change for concentrated
items. Second, the magnitude of the reduction in the volume of all or high-tax soft drinks pur-
chased was larger for carbonated drinks than it was for noncarbonated items. Finally, the vol-
ume of items purchased from major chain stores declined more after the tax policy than those
from local or independent stores.
Discussion
This study assessed the short-term (12 months after the implementation) changes in house-
hold-level purchasing of soft drinks after the Chilean SSB tax, controlling for regional
Table 3. Price regression model (log price/mL) with date of implementation and date of announcement.
All High-Tax Low-Tax No-Tax
Point estimate (implement) −0.010 −0.008 −0.017 0.017
Standard error 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Proportionate change (implement) −1.0% −0.8% −1.7% 1.7%
Point estimate (announcement) 0.016 0.019 0.013 0.001
Standard error 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Proportionate change (Announcement) 1.6% 1.9% 1.3% 0.1%
Mean outcome (log price/mL) 0.388 0.507 0.278 0.339
Number of Products 816 386 384 46
Number of Observations 37,699 19,693 15,632 2,374
Implement refers to September 2014 and Announcement refers to March 2014. Proportionate change = exp(point estimate) − 1.

P< 0.05

P< 0.01

P< 0.001.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002596.t003
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economic conditions, regional temperature, and long-term seasonal fluctuations, as well as
households’ time-invariant characteristics. Our main estimates suggest a significant, sizeable
reduction in the volume of high-tax soft drinks purchased (21.7%), which was also reflected in
a decrease in the amount of purchased added sugar from soft drinks (15.1%). In contrast, we
did not find any significant increase in the volume of low-tax items purchased.
The specific tax policy implemented by Chile is unique worldwide in that it (1) combines
increases in the tax for sugary soft drinks with decreases in the tax for less sugary ones and (2)
uses a specific threshold of added sugar concentration (6.25 g per 100 mL) to increase taxes by
5% for those beverages above, and to decrease taxes by 3% for those below, the threshold. By
contrast, the recent SSB tax policies in Mexico and in California proportionately linked the tax
to the overall volume of the beverage with added sugar. The magnitude of the tax incentive
also appears more modest than the recommended 20% tax that some organisations and
researchers have called for [33,34]. The finding that there appears to have been a short-term
change in purchasing suggests that, first, even more modest tax incentives have the potential to
reduce purchasing of SSBs and, second, that there may be more than one way in which an SSB
tax can be implemented with some success.
The fact that we found no consistent associations between the tax implementation and the
purchased volume of low-tax soft drinks may hint at the presence of asymmetries in the price
response between tax and subsidies, in contrast to the traditional assumption of symmetric
price elasticities. Prospect theory, developed by Kahneman and Tversky [35], may help explain
the phenomenon because it argues that consumers respond more strongly to a price increase
than to a price decrease, starting from the consumers’ internal reference price, against which
they assess the actual price of the beverage [36].
The reduction in purchasing of soft drinks shown in Table 2 is fairly widespread across SES
groups. Notably, for the volume of high-tax items purchased, the magnitude of reduction was
larger for the high-SES group than for the middle-SES group and statistically insignificant for
the low-SES group. This may be surprising to those who expect the response to be greatest
among those with the tightest budget constraints, i.e., those among the lower-SES group. On
the other hand, theoretical considerations also predict that higher- and middle-SES groups
could be better placed either to make cost-minimising purchasing decisions and/or to better
absorb and act upon the information conveyed by the tax change (i.e., that certain beverages
are deemed unhealthy) [37]. While many price elasticity studies, including one in Chile, show
that individuals or households at lower incomes are more elastic than those at higher incomes
[38,39], other studies—especially some that use randomised designs—reject the commonly
expected pattern in favour of a more even responsiveness across socioeconomic groups
[33,40,41].
Disaggregating the analyses by obesity status of the household, we found that all groups
responded to the tax by cutting down their purchasing of high-tax soft drinks. When disaggre-
gated by volume of high-tax soft drinks purchased in the pretax periods, all but the lowest cate-
gory of high-tax soft drink purchasers significantly reduced the volume of high-tax items
purchased. As is shown in Table 2, the baseline level of high-tax soft drink volume purchased
was similar between the high- and low-SES groups, and within the group of high-tax soft drink
purchasers, there was considerable representation of households from all SES categories. Dis-
aggregating the results further by splitting the low, medium, and high volume pretax purchas-
ers of soft drinks into low-, medium-, and high-SES groups, it turned out that what may be
driving the responsiveness within the high volume purchasers was the responsiveness of the
high-SES groups (see S15 Table). This is consistent with the greater overall change after the tax
among the high-SES group. However, again, there is some degree of sensitivity of these results
to the assumptions about the functional form of the time trend.
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For the first time that we are aware of in a study evaluating SSB taxation, this work has
examined more facets of the behavioural response pattern. First, we showed that households
decreased the frequency of shopping trips that included high-tax soft drinks and, perhaps as a
way of coping with the tax, households modestly increased the use of price promotions.
We found no major change in the price of soft drinks that were paid by the households. Sev-
eral factors may explain this finding. First, as emphasised before, the data only capture the
price of those items that are actually purchased. Consumers may have accepted a given price
only when it was at or below a level prior to the tax implementation, leading to a smaller
amount of high-tax soft drinks purchased without showing a significant increase in the prices
paid. This does remain compatible with the possibility that the prices posted in the stores
increased, which we could not examine in detail with the data at hand. Secondly, because the
SSB tax is an ad valorem tax with 2 different rates, it is possible that manufacturers reacted
strategically to partially or fully absorb the additional tax burden and did not pass-through the
tax to the final price—at least for the popular items we covered in this analysis—or they could
also have offset the price increase in the high-tax soft drinks via a smaller reduction in the
price of the low-tax items. Thirdly, there could be a mechanism at work producing behavioural
change that works independently of any price effect (e.g., via signalling of certain products as
‘unhealthy’). Finally, the SSB tax was only a minor part of a major tax reform, thus limiting its
public visibility, and those who have better access to information—such as those in higher SES
groups—may have been more likely to be aware of the SSB tax and react to it by reducing pur-
chases upon implementation. In S3 Text, S5 Fig, and S6 Fig, we present a time series of internet
searches for soft drink–and tax policy–related themes as a measure of public interest and infor-
mation-seeking behaviour, as retrieved from Google Trends. A modestly higher frequency of
internet searches for the related keywords was observed immediately after the policy
announcement and implementation. It may therefore be possible—though difficult to test for-
mally—that access to media and information sources, which tends to be greater among
higher-SES groups, might partially explain the differences in purchasing of SSBs across SES
groups after the tax implementation.
Strengths and limitations
Amajor strength of this evaluation is the quality of the data used, which are arguably the best
available for a short-term SSB purchasing evaluation of this tax policy. The data contain
detailed information of purchases of soft drinks at the household level as well as a range of
important household characteristics. Considerable human resources and efforts have been
invested into the collection of the data, with interviewers regularly visiting households that
were part of the panel. The methods used to analyse this data are also appropriate statistical
techniques widely used in the quasi-experimental policy evaluation literature, and they are
comparable to approaches employed in previous, similar policy evaluations [14].
In interpreting the results, several limitations need to be considered. First, because this is an
evaluation without a randomised design, it suffers from the lack of a proper control group in
the strict sense. We cannot exclude the possibility of not capturing the influence of time-vary-
ing unobservable factors. For example, we could not observe whether and how marketing
strategies (such as advertisement) might have changed after the announcement and implemen-
tation of the tax policy. Also, a new tax on alcoholic beverages was implemented at the same
time, which could be problematic for our SSB tax evaluation if there was substitution between
soft drinks and alcohol items. Because the tax reform also introduced several changes in other
taxes (e.g., income taxation) that might have had an impact on the economy, this could be
another source of endogeneity that cannot be entirely ruled out in the present analysis.
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Also, when interpreting the impacts found in this study, regression to the mean (RTM)
could be a concern [42]. RTM would occur if households whose pretax purchasing of soft
drinks became particularly high due to unobserved shocks or measurement errors. Those
households would show decreased purchasing even in the absence of the policy implementa-
tion, and if this was the case, then the estimates could have been overstated. In S7 Fig, S8 Fig,
S9 Fig and S10 Fig, we checked whether the trends (with standard deviations) of log-purchas-
ing of soft drinks appeared stable—separately by SES and the volume of pretax purchasing
group—in order to assess whether RTMmight play a role. The figures show that the pretax
purchasing was, overall, quite stable in terms of both level and deviation over the pretax period
for all groups, implying that RTM is unlikely to explain the results.
Secondly, the nutritional information that we used to classify the beverages into the relevant
tax categories was not originally part of the Kantar WorldPanel data but was collected by the
research team using national databases and captured only the items among the top 90% of
sales in the data. This means that our results predominantly represent consumers’ purchasing
of major items in the market, and not necessarily their purchasing all items.
Thirdly, the data captured household purchasing rather than what would ultimately affect
health outcomes, i.e., actual consumption. Moreover, given that the data are at household
level, we do not have information about how foods and beverages were allocated within the
household.
Fourthly, the data only cover households living in urban areas (North, Valparaiso Region,
Center South, Bio-Bio Region, and South). Whether or not purchasing of SSBs in rural areas
decreased after the tax implementation remains unknown; however, it is worth pointing out
that 90% of Chile’s population in 2016 was living in urban areas [43].
Finally, in the data, it is not possible to identify the reasons why a given household dropped
out of the survey. For example, if there were households dropping out due to health problems,
they might have had chronic conditions as a result of a poor diet—including excess consump-
tion of sugary drinks—in which case our data might underrepresent those households [44].
Although it is hard to predict the direction and magnitude of bias that may result from omit-
ting those households, this is certainly a limitation of the study. Because the prevalence of
high-volume SSB drinkers can be expected to be higher in the lower-SES group, health-related
attrition could potentially explain the heterogeneous findings across SES groups.
Implications for future research
While we applied a standard analytical approach to the best available data of SSB purchasing
in Chile, there is scope for further data collection and analyses. The data comprise less than
3,000 households that do not necessarily buy soft drinks regularly. Given the relatively limited
variations of purchasing, the within-household estimates of the changes in soft drink purchas-
ing for the full sample and certain subgroups could be subject to a degree of uncertainty (and
larger standard errors), depending on the functional forms assumed for the time trend in the
regression models. Nevertheless, the differences observed are in terms of the statistical signifi-
cance and the magnitude of the point estimates, but typically not in the direction of the
changes. Further data collection (which has been beyond the feasibility of the present research)
would likely reduce the uncertainty and increase the precision of the estimates.
Any changes in soft drink purchasing resulting from an SSB tax would be expected to entail
interactions, possibly substitutions between soft drinks and food items. In this study, we were
not able to examine the extent to which the tax policy was associated with the purchased
amount of overall sugar contained in all foods and beverages. For example, it could be the
case that those who reduced sugar from soft drinks did increase their sugar intake from
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confectionaries. Future research should explicitly consider nutrient information of food items
as well as of soft drinks and examine the role of the SSB tax in overall sugar intake from bever-
ages and foods. SSB intake accounts for about one quarter of the total sugar consumed by the
Chilean population [45], implying that a more broad-based sugar tax (also covering added
sugar in solid foods), or even a tax on energy-dense and ultra-processed foods more generally,
may be more effective in improving diet-related health outcomes. In this context, modelling
the anticipated health impacts of different tax strategies in Chile would be a relevant future
direction for research.
Finally, the use of fiscal incentives to combat obesity and related NCDs has now become a
promising policy tool in the eyes of many countries and of the World Health Organization,
even though only a few jurisdictions have hitherto implemented such policies [34]. To date,
the evaluative literature of SSB tax policies, including our present study, focusses on purchas-
ing with relatively short-term follow-up periods after the tax policies. Future evaluations
should include the impact of the policies on consumption and health outcomes. Currently, the
evidence on health outcomes (e.g., BMI) is typically based on epidemiological models that rely
on many assumptions and embody a substantial degree of uncertainty. Longer-term assess-
ments are needed, not least because the behavioural changes may either shrink or grow in the
long run [46]. The apparent association of the Chilean SSB tax with a reduction of purchases
of SSBs—and, in particular, the amount of added sugar in the short run—may nevertheless be
considered a promising result from a policy perspective.
Implications for policy
Previous studies focussed on evaluating the impact of the excise tax on purchases and found
some significant short-term reductions [14,17]. Our study evaluated an ad valorem tax and
also found some signs of a significant reduction in purchases. This might imply that the nature
of the tax—specific rate tax or ad valorem tax—would not critically affect the effectiveness of
the tax policy. However, in judging the full ‘success’ of the tax policy and in considering future
potential improvements, it needs to be borne in mind what the ultimate purpose of a corrective
tax should be, from an economic perspective, to help increase the price of SSBs so as to align
their full ‘social costs’—which include costs to society, the economy, health, and the environ-
ment—with the costs that are perceived by the individual. Such social costs could entail the
costs of future collectively funded extra health care costs to treat diet-related diseases or the
future health problems not anticipated by the individual consumer. With this in mind, it is
hard to argue against the notion that the higher the added sugar content in a given beverage,
the higher the social costs associated with the consumption of this beverage will be, and there-
fore the higher the taxed amount should be. In light of the current threshold nature of the Chil-
ean SSB tax, those who consume SSBs with particularly large amounts of added sugar (i.e., well
above 6.25 g per 100 mL) are not discouraged more than those who consume SSBs just above
the threshold. Similarly, those who consume SSBs just below the threshold are encouraged to
increase consumption. Although we did find that the amount of added sugar from soft drinks
purchased decreased overall, it is still far from clear that this tax design is best suited to maxi-
mise population health and social welfare.
The present study is the first to evaluate a reduction of the tax on ‘low-tax’ soft drinks
implemented in the real world. The results imply that consumers may not significantly
respond to a modest tax subsidy (by 3%) for less sugary soft drinks but may respond to a tax of
similar size (by 5%). The tax gap of 8% between high- and low-tax items did not appear to
induce considerable substitutions between items in respective categories. A recent WHO
report states that SSB prices would need to be raised by 20% or more in order to achieve
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meaningful health effects [34], a suggestion that may have been informed by previous studies
examining the impact of a 20% tax on SSBs [33, 47]. In the Chilean case, however, the rate was
far below this level.
The robust subgroup results for the high-SES groups suggest that the policy may have been
partially effective, though not necessarily likely to reduce socioeconomic inequalities in diet-
related health given that higher-SES groups appeared to have cut down on sugary drink pur-
chasing while the lower-SES groups have not. This could also imply that the financial burden
of the tax is predominantly carried by the latter, increasing the chances that the policy will
have regressive financial impacts. Ultimately, policy makers will need to decide whether the
expected gains in diet-related health for the higher-SES groups would compensate for poten-
tially increased inequities in diet-related population health.
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